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This paper investigates the strategic value of the managerial incentive scheme in affecting 
firms’ incentive in R&D investment and their product market activities. Firstly, we find 
that in Cournot-quantity competition, owners strategically assign a non-profit-
maximization objective to their managers. Consequently, managers in a delegation game 
invest more in cost-reducing R&D, and have higher output, lower prices and lower profits, 
as compared to profit-maximizers in a owner-run game.  Secondly, we find that R&D 
collusion induces owners in a delegation game to choose more aggressive managerial 
incentives as compared to R&D competition, which in turn leads to increased R&D 
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Empirical and theoretical research has yielded numerous insights into the intricate 
relationship between technological innovation and market structure in a given industry. 
However, the role of managerial incentives in this context has received relatively little 
but growing attention in the literature. What kind of managerial incentive scheme is 
more conducive to technological advancement and economic growth? How does 
product market competition affect the designing of managerial contracts and the 
incentive for technological innovation? Do different forms of technological innovation 
require different types of managerial incentives and how does this affect market 
outcomes?  This paper attempts to address these questions. 
The strategic value of a managerial contract in enhancing a firm’s competitiveness has 
been investigated in the strategic delegation literature. For instance, Vickers (1985), 
Fershtman (1985), Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) have demonstrated 
that, in an oligopolistic industry, the owner of a firm may strategically design non-
profit-maximizing managerial incentives for the manager. With Cournot-quantity 
competition, for instance, they have shown that a sales-promoting incentive contract 
may be more profitable to the owner than a profit-maximizing one.  
This early work, however, neglects the strategic interconnections of managerial 
contracts with firms’ incentives to innovate and in turn its market implications. The 
objective of this paper is to investigate the strategic interactions between firms, in both 
R&D activities and market place, on the owner’s choice of managerial contracts. It also 
investigates the role of collusive R&D activities in influencing the design of managerial 
incentive scheme.  We want to stress that the managerial incentives could be used by an 
  1owner as a strategic device to manipulate its rival manager’s behavior, not only in 
product market but also in R&D activities. On the other hand, managers’ different forms 
of R&D activities such as R&D collusion and R&D competition require different 
optimal managerial incentives and induce different market outcomes. 
In this paper, we consider a duopolisic industry in which each firm has one owner and one 
manager. Owners design incentive schemes for the managers, while managers make R&D 
and production decisions sequentially. The owners’ objective is to maximize firm profits 
while the managers’ is to maximize compensation. The owner delegates the game to 
manager to play on owner’s behalf.  The managerial contract serves as a precommitment 
for an owner to manipulate the actions of the rival manager in both R&D and production 
activities. We extend the managerial incentive framework introduced by Fershtman and 
Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) (hereafter, FJS) by endogenizing production cost in the 
R&D stage. The cost-reducing R&D is modeled according to Kamien, Muller and Zang 
(1992) (hereafter, KMZ). 
In particular, we analyze a three-stage game. In the first stage, owners simultaneously 
design a managerial incentive scheme which is publicly observable.
1  Following FJS, the 
incentive scheme is some linear function of firm profits and revenues. This function is 
endogenously chosen by an owner as a strategic tool to commit its manager to certain 
actions in the future R&D and product stages. Given the incentive scheme, in the second 
stage, managers make R&D decisions. In the third stage, managers make production 
decisions under Cournot-quantity competition. 
                                                           
1 Katz (1991) demonstrates that public observability of the managerial contracts is crucial in obtaining the 
strategic effects discussed in the strategic delegation literature. 
  2It is shown that at equilibrium, each owner directs its manager away from profit-
maximization to include sales.  As a consequence, managers in the delegation game behave 
more aggressively in both the R&D stage and production stage as compared to the profit-
maximizers in owner-run game.  That is, they have higher R&D investment, higher output, 
lower price and lower profits than the profit-maximizers.  In addition, it is shown that 
cooperative R&D induces owners to design more aggressive managerial incentives than 
non-cooperative R&D. As a result, R&D collusion brings about higher R&D investment, 
lower prices but higher profits as compared to R&D competition. 
Our first result is similar to that of FJS. Consider both downward-sloping R&D reaction 
functions and output reaction functions.  By strategically designing a sales-promoting 
incentive scheme, an owner enhances the aggressiveness of the manager when interacting 
with the rival (named “top dog” behavior by Tirole (1988)). This shifts out the firm’s R&D 
reaction function as well as output reaction function, which implies higher R&D 
investment, higher market share and higher profits.  The owner, in fact, acts as a 
Stackelberg leader of the manager of the rival firm. Naturally, when both owners design 
aggressive incentive schemes for their managers, the prisoners’ dilemma implies lower 
profits for both firms in the symmetric equilibrium. 
Our second result, however, is in sharp contrast to standard outcomes in the cooperative 
R&D literature. According to, for instance, d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and 
Kamien, Muller and Zang (1992), in the absence of R&D spillovers, cooperative R&D 
leads to lower R&D investment and higher product prices as compared to non-cooperative 
R&D. This is no longer true once owners choose managerial incentives prior to managers’ 
R&D and production decisions.  The intuition is as follows: R&D collusion raises 
profitability in product market, which drives owners to design more aggressive managerial 
  3incentives. This in turn leads to increased R&D activities as compared to non-cooperative 
R&D, and product prices drop as a result of enhanced firm competition. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, we set up a model for 
strategic delegation with R&D.  Section 3.1 analyzes the managerial incentives under non-
cooperative behaviors in both the R&D and production stages. Section 3.2 examines 
managerial incentives and market implications under cooperative R&D. Section 4 
compares the delegation game under non-cooperative R&D with that under R&D 
collusion.  The final section summarizes the results. 
2.  A Model of Strategic Delegation with R&D 
In this section we develop a model embodying managerial incentives, R&D activities, and 
product market competition. There are two firms (i and j) run by one manager each, playing 
a three-stage game. In the first stage, owners simultaneously sign an incentive scheme with 
their managers. In the second stage, managers either compete or collude in R&D activities. 
In the third stage, managers compete in product market according to Cournot. Following 
FJS, managers are characterized by a managerial incentive parameter α i >0 , where α i
i −
 is 
the weight on profits in manager i’s objective function given by UR ii i i =+ α π α () 1 , 
where  π i  and   are firm i’s profit and revenue functions, respectively. A profit-
maximizing firm is then analogous to setting 
Ri
α i = 1. In general, by varying α i, different 
levels of aggressiveness by the managers can be analyzed.  In particular, letting α i < 1 
implies that managers put a higher weight on revenue, or equivalently a lower weight on 
  4costs.
2  In this sense, managers in the delegation game behave more aggressively than 
profit-maximizers. 
In stage 1, owner i maximizes profits by choosing the incentive parameter α i. In doing so, 
owner i uses the incentive scheme U  as a strategic device to commit manager i to certain 
actions in the following R&D and production stages. 
i
 xi i C= c -f ( x) ii
f(x ) i
xi
f(x ) i ′ f> 0
f( ) 0
qi i
p(Q) ′ p< 0 ′′ p> 0
Q=q + ij
                                                          
In Stage 2, given the incentive scheme, manager i decides on cost-reducing R&D 
investments   to maximize U . The marginal costs of firm i are given by  , 
where   is the R&D production function, i.e., the amount of reduction in i’s marginal 
costs resulting from i’s R&D input  . There are no R&D spillovers. Following KMZ, it is 
assumed that    is twice differentiable, increasing ( ), concave ( ), 
, and uniformly bounded. There are no fixed costs.  
′′ f< 0
0 =
In Stage 3, given the incentive scheme and R&D decisions, manager i chooses production 
quantity    to maximize U  according to Cournot. As an extension of the previous 
literature, we use a general demand function  , assuming   and   (where 
 is the sum of firm i and j’s output)  q
3. Managerial Incentives, R&D and Market Competition  
3.1. Managerial Incentives under Non-Cooperative Behavior 
In this section we solve the above game for a subgame perfect equilibrium assuming that 
firms behave non-cooperatively in both R&D investment as well as in the product market. 
 
i
2 Note that the manager’s objective function can be written as UR T C iii =− α . 
  5For simplicity we only analyze symmetric equilibrium.  In Stage 3, manager i chooses q  




  .        ( 1 )   Up q p c f x i
q
ii i
i = ′ +− − = α (( ) ) 0
From equation (1), it is clear that manager i acts as if the marginal production cost is 
α i cf x (( − i ) ) ) ) ,  instead of ( . The existence and the stability of Stage 3 
equilibrium are guaranteed by the following assumption:
( cf x i −
 3 
Assumption 1:  .  ′′ + ′ < pq p i 0
This assumption assures that both output reaction curves are downward-sloping, i.e., 
managers compete in quantities which are strategic substitutes. 
The following Lemma describes the impact of R&D on final stage equilibrium output 
decisions. 
Lemma 1: An increase in firm i’s R&D investment increases firm i’s equilibrium 
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0 . Q.E.D. 
Lemma 1 is rather intuitive. More R&D spending by firm i increases its output since it 
reduces its marginal production cost. This in turn decreases j’s output through 
                                                           
p
3 This assumption assures that the second-order conditions  ,  and 



















q i = ′′ + Ui
qq ij<0 ′
  6strengthening i’s competitiveness due to the competition effect. Note that the industry 
aggregate output always increases as one of the firms increases its cost-reducing R&D.
4 
Next, we examine the (partial) effects of managerial incentives on output decisions, on 
the condition that both firms’ R&D investments are fixed. Implicitly differentiating 
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∂α η










0 .           (2) 
Hence, as owner i lowers α , firm i’s output increases but firm j’s output decreases, 
provided that both firms’ R&D investment remains unchanged. 
i
However, as α i changes, both firms’ R&D investments also change. The (total) effects 
of a change in α i on production consist of two parts:
5  first, the partial effects, as shown in 
the above; second, the R&D effects. These are the effects of   on output through 
changing both firms’ R&D investment, which are discussed next. 
α i
In Stage 2, manager i chooses the R&D level   to maximize U  yielding the first-order 
conditions, 
xi i









i = ′ + ′ − = () α α 0 .   (3) 
                                                           















































































  . 






ii ( ′ + ′ α
α i
) , represents the positive effect of manager i’s R&D 
effort on its utility through changing the rival’s output and its own marginal cost as 
well.  The second term,  , is the marginal R&D cost. 
The existence and stability of equilibrium in the R&D stage are guaranteed by the 
following assumption. 
Assumption 2: The second order conditions satisfy that U0 i
xx ii< ,  U j
xx jj<0  and 
. η
x xx xx xx xx UU UU
ii jj ij j i =− > 0
xi x j
i j i j
6 
This assumption is simplified into Assumption 2 in Kamien, Muller and Zang (1992) 
for a linear demand function.  It assures that   and   are strategic substitutes, i.e., 
both firms’ R&D reaction curves are downward-sloping. 
The effects of managerial incentives on R&D decisions are given by the following 
Lemma. 
Lemma 2:  As owner i lowers α i, firm i’s R&D investment increases but firm j’s R&D 





< 0;   
dx j
                                                          
d i α
> 0.  
Proof: See Appendix. 
The intuition is as follows. As owner i lowers α , firm i’s R&D reaction curve shifts 
out but firm j’s R&D reaction function shifts in.  This increases i’s R&D investment but 
i
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2
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xx ij=− . 








Now let us examine the (total) effects of managerial incentives on final stage equilibrium 
output, which is given by Lemma 3. 
Lemma 3:  As owner i lowers α i , firm i’s equilibrium output increases but firm j’s 







































































  .        Q.E.D. 
Therefore, the effects of managerial incentives on market shares are unambiguous. As 
owner i lowers  , firm i’s market share increases while the rival firm j’s declines. This is 
because manager i acts as the marginal production cost is  , instead of 
. As owner i reduces  , firm i’s output reaction curve shifts out but firm j’s 











() =− ′  and 
dc
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=− ′ <0 . Note that the total market output always increases as 
one of the owners lowers α i .  That is, 
dq q ij () +
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In an FJS setting, the change in one owner’s managerial incentive parameter only shifts 
its own output reaction function but not the rival firm’s. However, when production cost 
 









  9is endogenized in the R&D stage as in this paper, any change in one owner’s managerial 
incentive parameter will change both firms’ R&D investment, and consequently their 
marginal production costs. This causes both firms’ output reaction curves to shift, 
although in opposite directions. Therefore, when firms compete not only in market 
place but also in R&D activities, the strategic effects of managerial incentives upon 
managers’ productions are magnified through the effects on managers’ R&D 
investment. 
In Stage 1, owner i chooses α i to maximize π i  yielding the first-order conditions, 
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 .  (5) 
We can characterize the symmetric subgame-perfect equilibrium (  by the 
following theorem. 
αα α ij N =≡ )
Theorem 1: There exists a unique symmetric equilibrium such that α N <1.  
Proof: The proof is trivial from Lemma 1, 2, 3, equation (2) and inequality (5).  Q.E.D. 
Corollary: Managers in a delegation game invest more in R&D, produce higher output, 
charge lower prices and earn lower profits as compared to profit maximizers in an 
owner-run game. 
                                                           
8 We assume that the second-order conditions satisfy that  ,   and 
, which suffices the unique existence and stability of Stage 1 equilibrium. 
ηπ π π π
αα α αα α α α α =− ij ij








  10The intuition behind Theorem 1 and its Corollary  is as follows. By lowering the 
managerial incentive parameter, owner i commits manager i to invest more in R&D 
while manager j invests less in R&D, which reduces firm i’s marginal production costs 
while raising firm j’s. This shifts out i’s output reaction curve while shifting in j’s. This 
implies a higher market share and higher profits for firm i since these two firms are in a 
Cournot-quantity game. Therefore, by strategically designing sales-promoting 
managerial incentives, an owner acts as a Stackelberg leader vs. the manager of the 
competing firm, and commits its manager to more aggressive actions in both the R&D 
and production stages, leading to higher profits. Of course in symmetric equilibrium, 
both owners strategically direct their managerial incentives away from profit 
maximization towards sales, expecting higher profits. However, the prisoner’s dilemma 
implies higher output but lower profits for both firms than they would have had, had 
they chosen profit maximization as their managerial incentive. 
3.2. Managerial Incentives under Cooperative R&D 
In this section we allow the firms to collude in the R&D stage, but they continue to 
compete in the product market. The questions we would like to address are as follows. 
Does R&D collusion require different types of optimal managerial incentive schemes from 
R&D competition?  How do these incentive schemes induce different R&D investmenet 
and market outcomes? 
Following KMZ, R&D collusion is defined by managers coordinating their R&D activities 
so as to maximize their joint utility. In order to avoid cost allocation problems only the 
symmetric equilibrium is examined.  The first-order condition in Stage 3 is given by 
equation (1).  The managers’ production decisions are the same as those in Section 3.1. 
  11In Stage 2, manager i chooses   to maximize joint utility U  (where UU ), 
yielding the first-order condition
xi U ij =+
9 














i = ′ + ′ + ′ − = () αα 0 .               (6) 






, represents the negative externality of manager i’s R&D input on 
combined-utility.  It is this negative externality which is ignored in equation (3) by a 
manager under R&D competition, but is internalized in equation (6) when managers 
maximizing cartel’s joint utility.  This negative externality inhibits managers R&D 
investment and results in lower R&D spending and lower output under R&D collusion 
than under R&D competition, as shown in KMZ.  However, in strategic delegation 
game, as illustrated in the following equation (7), there is another effect which goes in 
the opposite direction through owners’ choice of managerial incentives. Hence, the 
overall effect of R&D collusion is not as obvious as that in KMZ and the others. 
Similar to Lemma 2 and 3, under cooperative R&D, the effects of managerial incentives 
on R&D investment and output are described by Lemma 4. 
Lemma 4: Under R&D collusion, as owner i lowers α i, firm i’s R&D investment and 





















Proof: See Appendix. 
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  12In Stage 1, owner i chooses α i non-cooperatively to maximize π i  yielding the first-
order conditions: 
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  (7) 










,  represents the negative externality of owner i’s 
choice of managerial incentive on its profit, passed from composite externality on 
manager i’s R&D spending and on managers combined-utility.  It is this externality that is 
ignored in equation (4) as each manager competes in R&D stage, but internalized in 
equation (7) as managers maximize R&D cartel’s combined utilities.  This negative 
externality encourages each owner to lower the managerial incentive parameter and 
thereby commits the manager to higher R&D investment and higher output.   
Interestingly, this effects could be so large that it is more than offsetting the usual 
negative effects from forming R&D cartel, such as a decline in R&D investment and an 
increase in product prices.
 10   
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The symmetric equilibrium under R&D collusion is characterized by the following 
theorem. 
                                                           
10 Precise proof will be given in Theorem 4. 
  13Theorem 2: Under R&D collusion, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium such that 
.  α C <1
Proof: The proof is trivial from Lemma 4, equation (2) and inequality (8).  Q.E.D. 
In next section, we would like to compare the managerial incentives under R&D 
competition to that under R&D collusion and examine how these incentives in turn 
affect managers’ R&D activities and production decisions. 
4. The Comparison of Managerial Incentives under R&D Competition and R&D 
Collusion 
For simplicity, in this section we assume that the demand function is linear,  . 
The comparison between managerial incentives under R&D competition (hereafter, N) 
and under R&D collusion (hereafter, C) is given by Theorem 3. 
p=a-bQ
Theorem 3: The managerial incentive scheme under R&D collusion is more aggressive 
than that under R&D competition. That is,   .  α α CN <
Proof: See Appendix. 
R&D collusion, through maximizing the joint utilities, internalizes the negative 
externalities of managers’ R&D investment on their rival managers’ utilities, thereby 
increasing their firms’ profits as compared to R&D competition.  This in turn drives owners 
to strategically set more aggressive managerial incentives for their managers and therefore 
commit managers to invest more in R&D and produce more output. Letting  ,  ,    
xN PN and  ,  ,   denote equilibrium R&D level, price and profits under R&D collusion 
and R&D competition, respectively, we have 
xC PC π C
π N
  14Theorem 4: R&D collusion yields higher R&D investment, lower prices and higher profits 
as compared to R&D competition. That is,     and  .   xx CN > PP C < N
                                                          
π π CN >
Proof: See Appendix. 
Our results are in sharp contrast with the standard analysis in cooperative R&D as for 
example in KMZ.  They suggest that  cooperative R&D yields lower R&D investment, 
lower consumer surplus as compared to non-cooperative R&D, in the absence of R&D 
spillovers. However, this result does not necessarily hold true once owners decide 
managerial incentives prior to managers’ R&D and production decisions. The logic behind 
this difference is that cooperation between managers in the R&D stage increases 
profitability in the product market, which induces owners to compete more in the first stage 
by setting more aggressive managerial incentives.
11 These more aggressive managerial 
incentives drive managers to more investment in R&D and more production in market 
place. As a consequence, R&D collusion yields higher R&D investment and lower prices.  
However, it is worth noting that firms still benefit from collusive R&D activities.  Hence, 
in a strategic delegation game, R&D collusion unambiguously improves both consumer 
and producer surplus. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we study the strategic advantages of managerial incentives in influencing 
firms’ incentives to innovate as well as in enhancing their competitive position in market 
place. We conclude that for managerial firms engaging in Cournot-quantity competition, 
 
11 The intuition is similar to that contained in the semi-collusion literature. Fershtman and Gandal (1994) 
demonstrate that collusion in the later stage may intensify competition in the previous stage. 
 
  15owners strategically design sales-promoting incentive for their managers. As a result, 
managers invest more, produce more, charge lower prices and make less profits as 
compared to the profit-maximizers. Furthermore, we elaborate the effects of collusive R&D 
activities on the design of managerial incentives and their consequences in product market.  
R&D collusion induces owners to choose more aggressive managerial incentives as 
compared to R&D competition. Accordingly, R&D collusion generates more R&D 
investment, higher production, lower product price, but higher profits.  That is, cooperative 
R&D improves both consumer surplus and producer surplus as compared to non-
cooperative R&D. 
However, in this paper, we assume that there are no spillovers in firms’ R&D activities.
12 
Given the frequent movement of researchers and engineers and other information flow 
between firms, one firm’s R&D activities may benefit other firms without costs.  If the 
degree of R&D spillovers is high, owners may strategically design sales-penalizing (instead 
of sales-promoting) managerial incentive schemes and thereby commit managers to less 
aggressive behavior in both R&D activities and market place (see Zhang and Zhang 
(1997)). 
                                                           
12 Rabah Amir (1998) provides an extensive comparison between two ways of modelling R&D with 
spillovers….the effect of spillover on R&D investment in Kamien-Muller-Zang (1992) model v.s. the 
effect of spillover on R&D final outcomes in d’Aspremont-Jacquemin (1988) model.   
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> 0.                         Q.E.D. 
Proof of Theorem 3: For linear demand  , rearranging the first order 
conditions in Stage 1, 2 and 3 at the symmetric equilibrium, we have 
pab Q =−
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Then α N  is the solution to  N( ) α =0  and α C is the solution to C( ) α =0 . 

















αα <0 ′ < N( )
, moreover from the 
second order condition  , we have  α 0.  Thus, α α NC >             Q.E.D. 
Proof of Theorem 4: From (a1) and (a2), (a4) and (a5), we know that   and   are the 
solutions to 
xN xC
 and  , respectively.  




′ −−= fa cf
b
N (( ) ) α
9
4
′ −−= fa cf
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 and Cx .   ) )
9
Since  Nx Cx c f f b NC () ()( ) ( ) . =− − −′ +< α α 225 0 and  . Thus,  .  ′ < Nx ()0 xx CN >
From (a1) and (a4), it is trivial that  .  qq CN >
Now we want to show that π π CN > . 
π α π α CC CN () ( > ) =
−− − − −
−
( ( ( )))( ( ) ( ( ))) a c fx a c fx
b
x





 is the solution to  xCN ′ −−= fa cf
b




Since   is the solution to  xN ′ −−= fa cf
b
N (( ) ) α
9
4
.  Thus,  .  xx CN N <
  18Moreover, since  []
d
dx
a c fx a c fx b x
CN
NC N N C N ( ( ( )))( ( )( ( ))) −− − − − − αα 32 9C N
b 9
 
  =   [] ′ −− − − − − − fa c f x c f x NN C N N N C N () (( ( ) ) ) () ( ( ) ) 33 1 αα αα
  =−   [] − − ′ 31 1 5 () . ( ( ) ) αα NN C N bc f x f <0
Therefore, π α CN () =
−− − − −
−
( ( ( )))( ( ) ( ( ))) a c fx a c fx
b
x
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That is, π π CN > .                          Q.E.D. 
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